Logic of Grounding: An alternative approach

The concept of *grounding* has a long and venerable history that starts with Aristotle and continues through philosophers such as Ockham or Bolzano. Quite recently there has been increasing interest not only in the notion of grounding itself, but also in the logic of grounding. In Schnieder (2011), Correia (2010, 2014), Fine (2012a,b) and Litland (2012), we can find different attempts to capture the structural and logical properties of the concept in question. The main aim of this talk is to present a different approach to the logic of grounding. Let me call this approach **LG**. The central characteristics of **LG** are the following. **LG** is natural deduction calculus that (i) tries to capture the notion of full, immediate and strict ground; (ii) extends the classical natural deduction calculus by means of a new consequence relation and the corresponding language operator; (iii) finally, in **LG** the relationship between grounding and derivability is taken into account and clarified.

References

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